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Introduction: From “activists” (jijifenzi) to
“volunteers” (zhiyuanzhe), the evolution of
residents’ involvement in the
neighbourhoods of Beijing 
At the intersection of two little streets in central Beijing stand tworesidents wearing red armbands. They are part of the “securitybrigade” (zhi’an xunluodui): 
I do this because I have time to spare. I come here once a week for
two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon. (1)
As this scene demonstrates, it is not rare to come across elderly people
wearing red armbands, chatting on the pavement, and observing passers-
by. They are neighbourhood volunteers whose status is ambiguous: “We are
activists (jijifenzi) from the residents’ committee.” But the director of the
residents’ committee (2) corrects her: “No, you should say something else
now, you should say you are volunteers (zhiyuanzhe).” (3)
The term “activist” echoes the policy of inciting the “enthusiastic partic-
ipation of the masses” implemented from the earliest days of the People’s
Republic of China. Social control has long involved citizens in the kind of
close surveillance found in other authoritarian socialist regimes, notably in
Cuba. (4) Large public organisations and institutions such as factories and
administrative authorities managed the daily work and lives of workers, em-
ployees, and their families through the work unit system. Ideological vol-
untarism constituted an integral part of the political culture, acting as a
system of social control through which workers also obtained protection
in the shape of lifelong employment, medical help, and housing (Solomon
1969; Whyte and Parish 1984; Walder 1986; Mok 1988; Shaw 1996). Eco-
nomic reforms have modified the employment market and limited the pre-
dominance of work units, reconfiguring the field of social assistance and
care of urban dwellers and focusing on the idea of “neighbourhood com-
munities” (shequ). (5)
Since the 1980s, urban security surveillance has included new players who
assist the police. Security guards (bao’an) constitute a new professional cat-
egory. The job of chengguan appeared in the 1990s with a view to cracking
down on illicit commercial practices (Caron 2013). The residents’ commit-
tees, formerly made up of resident “activists,” became more professional,
whilst at the same time retaining their ambiguous status as “autonomous
local grassroots organisations” (jiceng qunzhongxing zizhi zuzhi). (6) Their of-
ficials are now salaried and do not necessarily live in the “neighbourhood
community” (shequ) they manage. Their work is now directed towards ad-
ministrative work and social care. As grassroots organisations, they also
claim to be guarantors of the development of “local democracy” (jiceng
minzhu) in that they organise elections every three years. 
As for the housing that has appeared since the liberalisation of housing
policies, this is run by property management companies (wuye guanli
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1. Red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 9 April 2007.
2. Residents’ committees are organisations designed to manage the population in the neighbour-
hoods of Chinese cities. 
3. Red-armband volunteer and the director of her residents’ committee in the historic quarter, 29
September 2007.
4. In Cuba, the “Committees for the Defence of the Revolution,” which were rooted into the social
fabric of the living environment, have retained a social usefulness (Colomer 2000; Giraldou 2016).
In the case of East Germany, the inhabitants were also involved in the management of neigh-
bourhoods, dealing with problems in apartment buildings, against the background of a housing
crisis (Rowell 2006).
5. In the post-danwei era, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzhengbu) has taken charge of social care
once again and in 2000 launched a policy of “neighbourhood community building” (shequ jianshe).
These are administrative zones for local management defined according to geographic and de-
mographic variables (Bray 2005). 
6. Organic Law of the Urban Residents’ Committees of the People’s Republic of China, 1989.
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gongsi ) financed by service charges paid by property owners, who can them-
selves form committees (yezhu weiyuanhui). Yet even in the context of the
professionalization of security and the growing complexity of neighbourhood
management, the legacy of neighbourhood surveillance still persists.
In the press, ordinary citizens, known as the “masses,” are often quoted
by the police as having contributed to the arrest of wrongdoers. The anti-
terrorist law passed in early 2016 underlined the importance of the role of
ordinary people in spotting suspicious activities and in denunciation, en-
couraging people to inform the police in exchange for payment. (7) However,
the official resident-volunteer system (zhiyuanzhe) does not include finan-
cial remuneration. 
Since the 2000s, charging ordinary citizens with surveillance responsibil-
ities and volunteer services has been reconfigured and is now presented as
being inspired by “the West” (xifang). (8) Several years before the 2008
Olympic Games, the municipality of Beijing launched a campaign to recruit
100,000 volunteers, encouraging young people, schoolchildren, and students
to become involved on a voluntary basis in tasks such as translation and
directing tourists with a view to creating a “civilised” city (wenming). The
municipal authorities saluted the success of this policy. (9) Volunteering by
young students has already been examined as a ritual of socio-political pro-
motion (Doyon 2016), but the way in which the neighbourhood volunteer
networks are formed remains to be developed. 
Resident-volunteering has also been the object of campaigns on the part
of the public authorities at key political moments. During the hosting of
the Olympic Games in Beijing, the system was adapted to fit a Western lex-
ical field (“community building” shequ jianshe, “volunteer” zhiyuanzhe re-
placing “activist” jijifenzi, and becoming as commonly used as the older
idea of yigong) whilst at the same time retaining the vocabulary of the
Maoist era, as can be seen in Photo 1, where a list of the principles of vol-
unteering translated from English appears alongside an illustration of the
national hero Lei Feng. (10) The Ministry of Civil Affairs, for example, launched
a policy of promoting urban volunteer services (zhiyuan fuwu) in 2014. At
the end of the year, the media reported that the town of Beijing had more
than 1.5 million registered neighbourhood volunteers (shequ zhiyuanzhe),
divided into 12,908 teams, and who had performed 19,610,000 hours of
service over the year. (11)
During the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Bei-
jing, the residential neighbourhoods are controlled by residents wearing red
armbands. During traditional Chinese festivals such as the Spring Festival, the
city of Shanghai recruits resident volunteers to patrol and denounce the use
of fireworks, a practice forbidden in the city centre since 2016. Since the 1950s,
residents have been involved in the maintenance of local public order. But how
has this commitment been reconfigured within the framework of the neigh-
bourhood, a space subject to specific standards of use (Kaufmann 1983)?
In the scientific field, the theoretical framework focuses on a dialectic be-
tween Party-state and volunteers (Zhu 2010; Luova 2011; Shue 2011), in
which social control (Wong and Poon 2005, Read 2012) under the Chinese
regime is being reconfigured, or even reinforced in more insidious ways, in
line with Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Chong 2011). This con-
ceptual framework poses a problem of scale and tends to reinforce the in-
tentionality of the state’s action on society. It must be remembered that
although specific to the Chinese regime, the system under study remains a
form of social control at the neighbourhood level – a phenomenon not lim-
ited to authoritarian regimes – that has been the subject of studies from
the very beginnings of urban sociology. (12) In American cities, for example,
Jane Jacobs noticed the “eyes on the street” of social control (Jacobs 1961,
p. 35). In the case of China, the inhabitants have been, and are still, active
in surveillance systems, originally with a view to the ideological control of
morals, and nowadays as vigilantes ensuring the safety of public spaces. But
this system also produces other social effects: volunteers make themselves
available to help others; and the red-armband patrollers take the opportu-
nity to chat and participate in leisure activities with their neighbours. An
ethnographic study on these practices has allowed me to understand the
context of the system, half-way between institutional mobilisation and ve-
hicle of socialisation. Somewhere between imposition and moral responsi-
bility, these inhabitants are reshaping the “activism” of the Communist era
into a new form of participation. 
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7. See for example, “Beijing shi min jubao waiji nanzi she kong huo jiangjin 3000 yuan” (The munic-
ipality of Beijing has given a 3,000-yuan reward to a man who helped to arrest a foreigner sus-
pected of terrorism), Jinghua shibao (Beijing Times), 1 March 2016.
8. Internal publications of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
9. “Mei yi tiao hutong dou you women de anbaoyuan” (Our security guards can be found in each
hutong), Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekly), 7 August 2008.
10. The use of Lei Feng’s image has been modified from that of a Maoist revolutionary to an ideal of
civic citizenship, promoting philanthropic values of altruism and common good (gongyi) (Palmer
and Ning 2017; Jeffreys and Su 2016).
11. “Beijing shi zhuce shequ zhiyuanzhe yi da 150 wan ren” (In the city of Beijing, 1.5 million volun-
teers have been registered), Beijing ribao, 3 December 2014.
12. A reference to the Chicago sociological tradition.
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Photo 1 – Surveillance by the neighbours (邻里守望), volun-
teer services, taking care of the handicapped (关爱残疾人),
taking care of lonely elderly people (关爱空巢老人), child-
minding (关爱留守儿童), looking after migrant workers(关爱
农民工). Poster. © Judith Audin, April 2015.
I carried out ethnographic research on resident-volunteering in Beijing
as part of doctoral (2007-2012), then post-doctoral (2015), studies. The
study of contrasting neighbourhoods enabled me to identify not only the
transversal characteristics of this practice, but also its local specificities,
notably a more systematic presence in the historic neighbourhoods. The
first neighbourhood is located in the alleyways (hutong) of the historic
centre of Beijing, in the district of Xicheng, where housing takes the form
of single-storey (pingfang) houses built around square courtyards (si-
heyuan), and where forms of gentrification and tourism are appearing.
The second neighbourhood is located in an industrial zone undergoing
conversion. Dating from the years 1950 to 1990, this estate of functional,
standardised dwellings was attached to work units (danwei), which
meant that residents knew each other very well since they were at one
and the same time colleagues and neighbours. The third type of neigh-
bourhood is a commodity housing estate (shangpinfang xiaoqu), built in
the 2000s after the housing policy reforms and located close to the sixth
ring-road in Tongzhou District. 
This article analyses volunteering by residents, not only as a political
system but also as an activity that is given meaning in context by the
players. How do the role-plays and reciprocity that result from resident-
volunteering contribute to mixing the sphere of responsibility and the
sphere of ordinary sociability? Although volunteers become involved on
orders from outside, the practice is also the result of other motives, (13)
linking it to the idea of “public altruism” developed by David Palmer and
Rundong Ning (Forthcoming). I will first show that volunteering by resi-
dents contributes to the control of neighbourhood space, then go on to
study the motives for volunteer involvement, demonstrating that forced
participation also allows residents to become committed to this local
activity. 
Resident volunteering, a system for the
control of residential space in Beijing
In the neighbourhoods of Beijing, resident-volunteering constitutes a sys-
tem that is integrated into local time and space. The system is political in
nature, since it is institutionalised and organised by CCP cells, the residents’
committees, in the shequ, that is to say, the areas where residential neigh-
bourhoods are managed. 
Organisation of the neighbourhood-volunteer
networks 
In Beijing, there exists a network for the management of residential areas
centred on grassroots organisations that are theoretically “autonomous”
(zizhi), such as residents’ committees. The latter mobilise “residents’ teams”
(jumin xiaozu) at the local level. The residents’ committee agents base their
work on networks of resident-volunteers, managed and accounted for in
the official statistics of the neighbourhood communities (shequ). This vol-
unteering policy is part of the “local democracy” component assessed by
the street office (jiedao banshichu), the hierarchical superior of the resi-
dents’ committee. There are three types of permanent volunteer. 
Firstly, there are the residents’ representatives (jumin daibiao), theoreti-
cally elected by the residents, who are responsible for neighbourhood affairs.
They serve as go-betweens for the residents and their residents’ committee
and are invited to voice their opinions during regular meetings.
A representative: “The residents’ representatives are a category of
volunteers. They are usually elected.” The employee of the residents’
committee: “But they were not elected here.”The man clarifies: “Yes,
but according to the rules, there must be an election.”She replies: “In
general, the election rule is not really applied.” (14)
We meet the residents and take note of their remarks. Then we
pass on the complaints to the residents’ committee. (15)
The employees of the residents’ committees organise bi-annual assem-
blies of the residents’ representatives (jumin daibiao dahui) to “take stock”
(zongjie) of actions that have been carried out and problems that remain
to be dealt with. These representatives are also the principal electors in the
elections to the residents’ committees every three years. (16)
The second type of permanent volunteer is the building supervisor (lou-
men zhang), whose job it is to report his neighbours’ problems to the resi-
dents’ committee. These volunteers are recruited from amongst permanent
residents who do not work (retired people, housewives, the unemployed).
Their distribution depends on the architecture of the housing, as can be
seen from the following table: 
Housing volunteers paste up any new official notices (sent out by the res-
idents’ committee) in the communal areas of their building, collect the san-
itation charges in the historic and danwei neighbourhoods, ensure good
behaviour in the neighbourhood, and serve as intermediaries in case of prob-
lems in the building: 
Most of the building supervisors are retired and know their apart-
ment block and neighbours very well. The person responsible for the
block (louzhang) ensures that life in the building runs smoothly.
Today, there are fewer quarrels between neighbours but there are al-
ways things that need to be sorted out. For example, if someone dies
in one of the flats… (17)
We take care of people’s problems. If we can’t manage, we go see
the residents’ committee or the level above that, the street office
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13. The problem of involvement occurs in other contexts (Mazeaud and Talpin 2010).
14. Residents’ representative, new neighbourhood, 23 June 2008.
15. Residents’ representative, historic neighbourhood, 25 April 2009.
16. According to several field surveys on local elections in 2009, 2012, and 2015.
17. Director of the residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 28 April 2007.






































(jiedao banshichu). In general, we can manage small problems. If it’s
a material problem, we call the management company. The people
responsible for the building act as intermediaries for the residents. (18)
In China, the population is huge. […] So we have to have all these
administrative levels. […] The street office represents the higher level
of government, then the residents’ committee organises teams of
residents like me. […] It’s a sort of chain system that links to the
building. If we are looking for someone, we find them very quickly. (19)
The role of the housing volunteers is similar to that of a caretaker. Involved
in the management of their block, they obtain this position without really
being elected: 
The neighbours can contact me during the day with any problems
by knocking on my door or telephoning. People who work and who
are not in during the day have less contact with the volunteers and
their residents’ committee. But everyone in the building knows who
I am, all the same. (20)
Three building supervisors (louzhang) are appointed in the premises
of the residents’ committee. The residents are then asked if they ac-
cept this choice. […] Of course they approve. How could they not
approve? People who are unpaid yet devote themselves to providing
them with services, who agree to do this in their spare time. It suits
everyone. (21)
These volunteers give the impression of an omnipresent power. They con-
tribute to controlling the space by means of localised eyes and ears. They
discipline the population by disseminating the new policies and objectives
of the state authorities. (22) In actual fact, surveillance is not systematic
whilst remaining attentive to problematic behaviour (intra-family conflicts,
problems between neighbours, suspicious activity) or practical problems in
the building (damage to communal areas, water leaks). For example, during
a day of fieldwork carried out in the office of a residents’ committee, I saw
an employee ask a building supervisor to write down the names of the res-
idents in his building who were not natives of Beijing (waidiren). She knew
their names and apartment numbers by heart. (23) During the SARS epidemic
in 2003, these volunteers were also widely deployed in the prevention of
disease and to monitor contamination. 
The third type of permanent volunteer has the job of supervising public
spaces. These are the members of the “security patrols” (zhi’an xunluodui),
who wear red armbands (Photo 2).
Besides these, there is a more occasional type of volunteer recruitment,
intended for socio-cultural events, and present in all three categories of
neighbourhood. As organisers of sport and cultural activities (dance, choral
singing, taiji), the agents of residents’ committees recruit “talented” resi-
dents to give lessons or provide services (street hairdressing). The cultural
and sporting activities of each neighbourhood community are presented at
regular public performances (at least once every three months). (24) The
search for talent aims to give a good image of the neighbourhood, since
artistic performances are reported in the “neighbourhood community”
(shequ) column of the local paper. (25)
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18. Housing volunteer, workers’ quarter, 26 April 2007.
19. Four volunteers, workers’ quarter, 1 October 2007.
20. Building supervisor, workers’ quarter, 26 April 2007.
21. Apartment block supervisor, workers’ quarter, 26 April 2007.
22. Reminiscent of the cells of the DCR in Ben Ali’s Tunisia (Hibou 2006, pp. 114-115).
23. Residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 10 April 2007.
24. For example, during one such show, an 86 year-old resident performed a scene from a Beijing
opera (observation, workers’ quarter, 28 April 2007).
25. The opera-lover was interviewed by a journalist from the Evening Legal News (Fazhi Wanbao).
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Photo 2 –Volunteer in the historic quarter. 
© Judith Audin, April 2015.
Photo 3 – Security volunteers, historic quarter. 
© Judith Audin, December 2016.
The officials from the residents’ committees also mobilise their permanent
volunteers to improve the appearance of certain neighbourhoods, notably
the historic quarters, whose architecture opens onto public space and for
which the town council provides only a limited maintenance service (rub-
bish collection). For example, on 1 May each year, the building supervisors
clean the neighbourhood and take down the advertising posters in the stair-
cases. (26) In this neighbourhood with poorly maintained communal areas, a
garden-lover was noticed because his passion fitted into the framework of
local “greening”: 
My hobby has always been gardening. I don’t have enough space in
my apartment. And it’s good for the environment. Last year, I planted
jasmine. It smelt lovely. But I don’t do it for money. The organisers of
the residents’ committee noticed I liked planting flowers. They liked
that. They asked me what I needed. So I made some suggestions […].
If I need money to buy seeds or earth, they can give me some. (27)
From time to time, in the lanes of the historic centre, volunteers are
recruited during campaigns to promote the “civilised” image of a neigh-
bourhood (wenming) by repainting walls covered with advertise-
ments. (28)
The volunteering system is created and organised by the residents’ CCP
cell. The object is to demonstrate the participation of local citizens because
the officials of the residents’ committees are judged by their hierarchical
superiors on their ability to mobilise and integrate residents into the official
volunteering system. Whilst the aim of occasional volunteering is to project
a good image of the neighbourhood by highlighting its “talented personal-
ities,” long-term volunteering serves as a means of transmitting information,
of mediation, and of mutual assistance in order to ensure order at the local
level. Taken together, the contributions of the volunteers (a resident can
carry out several types of volunteer work) give the neighbourhood a
“civilised” image. Within the three long-term volunteer networks, the “se-
curity patrols” with their red armbands knotted around their arms ensure a
daily presence outdoors, assisting the police, the chengguan, and the resi-
dents’ committees. 
Micro-politics of the neighbourhood security patrols 
Organised by each residents’ committee, the security patrols are tasked
with keeping an eye during the day not only on the lanes of the historic
centre and the communal areas of secured apartment blocks, but also on
public spaces (avenues and squares) near housing, with the aim of comple-
menting the work of the security professionals. The way in which these se-
curity teams are organised depends on their locality. Volunteers are chosen
according to their address. The patrols are made up of teams of two people,
generally of the same sex, (29) and work to a weekly timetable, two hours in
the morning and two hours in the afternoon.
Whilst recognising that the “security patrols” are less present in commod-
ity housing estates that are managed by security guards and equipped with
video-surveillance systems, the members of these patrols and the agents
of the residents’ committees emphasise their usefulness: 
The security teams are obviously very useful! There are things that
the security guards (bao’an) can’t see, since they are posted at the
entrance of the buildings. The volunteers keep a very close watch on
the entrances to the buildings. If there’s a problem they can call the
police. (30)
In a little street near Houhai Lake, several people wearing the red armband
are chatting: 
“Security in China is above reproach.” Not far away, a police officer
adds, “It’s a really positive system because it gives older people some-
thing to do during the day and dissuades delinquents from commit-
ting misdemeanours, notably burglaries.” 
Although there is an imbalance between old and new districts, the presence
of volunteers depends on political campaigns, with a presence in the entire
town during big events such as the CCP’s National Party Congress, which
takes place in Beijing, the headquarters of the central state institutions. 
Volunteers start when they retire and continue as long as they are able.
They must remain attentive, both in summer and winter, and outdoors for
the whole day. According to their accounts, it is neither “easy” nor “pleas-
ant,” but they are accustomed to it. After their duties have become routine,
the officials of the residents’ committees no longer systematically take
note of the presence of the volunteers and let them organise themselves.
If a volunteer cannot attend, he arranges to change shifts with another
volunteer. However, if someone makes a habit of being absent, he or she
would be upbraided. On 1 May, an employee of the residents’ committee
returned from an inspection of the neighbourhood in a state of panic: “Not
a single security volunteer is at his post!” The secretary of the local Com-
munist Party branch immediately telephoned one of the building supervi-
sors, requesting in urgent, anxious tones that he resolve the problem. (31)
The neighbourhood security patrols are characterised, therefore, by the
politics of “presence”: 
The volunteers are present once a week and are not allowed to be
absent. Even in winter when it’s snowing or raining, we have to be
outside in the same spot. (32)
They must submit to a long-term schedule. But in fact, the content of the
mission is free of any real repressive dimension: 
We are not really tasked with security. For example, it’s useful if peo-
ple need to ask the way. We are very familiar with the neighbourhood
and can show them which road to take. (33)
In the town centre, in general, there are no security problems. So
there isn’t much to do, in fact. […] But before, in the 1990s, there
was a lot of disorder; there were fights, thefts… (34)
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26. Observation, workers’ quarter, 1 May 2007 and 1 May 2015.
27. Volunteer gardener, 70, workers’ quarter, 30 March 2007.
28. Observation and interview with an employee of a residents’ committee, historic quarter, April
2015.
29. A narrow majority of women can be observed. 
30. Employee of the residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 5 April 2007.
31. Observation, residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 1 May 2007.
32. Volunteers, historic quarter, 11 April 2007.
33. Two red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 12 March 2008.
34. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 10 June 2008.
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I have to keep an eye on the road, maintain security. But in actual
fact, what I do is above all to set tourists on the right road. (35)
There is no insecurity. We ensure there are no thieves, but if we did
spot one, we couldn’t do anything, just telephone the police by di-
alling 110. (36)
My study noted that on several occasions the security volunteers were
even disoriented when a violent incident broke out on their watch (brawls,
pickpocketing), not knowing whether to intervene or how. (37) I observed,
therefore, a role not so much of repression as of witness to public order,
and at the same time a much greater presence in the historic quarters, since
the security of commodity housing is the job of other players. 
Loyalty, dynamism, and efficiency: “Exemplary”
volunteers and retired people (38)
Although short-term volunteers have varied social profiles, long-term vol-
unteers are always long-standing residents of the neighbourhood who are
very familiar with its history and geography. The age of the volunteers is an
important factor, and the majority are retired. The residents’ committee of-
ficials choose people with free time, but that is not enough. In particular,
residents’ representatives and intermediaries in the apartment buildings
must be loyal and agree to perform services for the residents’ committee.
The officials must be able to count on them. The volunteers are requested
to identify local problems that the employees of the residents’ committee
cannot see: material problems in the building, quarrels between neighbours,
information about the neighbours. Volunteers are also recruited “because
they are able to deal with matters relating to the life of the neighbour-
hood,” (39) that is to say, they are involved in the affairs of the neighbourhood
and have a good, long-standing relationship with the other residents. Resi-
dents with jobs are absent from the neighbourhood during the day and so
have very little contact with the employees of the residents’ committee.
The latter therefore need people who can act as go-betweens with the ab-
sentees. They “choose the volunteers on their personality” (40) to ensure there
is dialogue with the other residents. This would suggest a form of recruit-
ment by co-optation. The teams of volunteers are organised by CCP mem-
bers associated with the local Party cell. “In general, we’re all retired.”
Another person adds, “We are all members of the Communist Party… Well,
most of us.” (41)
Members of the CCP volunteer easily, but also identify other trustworthy
residents. In general, these are residents with a reputation for being zealous
workers and who continue to lead a simple life in the neighbourhood, fo-
cusing on official community activities. The officials of the residents’ com-
mittee select these devoted, model residents whose behaviour in public is
exemplary. They are politically “conformist”: 
I am not a volunteer. The residents’ committee does not call on me
because I opposed the government. For three years, I was under
surveillance by the police. […] I was opposed to the Party. (42)
The volunteers are not paid, which maintains the image of spontaneous
and self-organised participation by residents in local public affairs: 
These are our volunteers. They don’t earn money and participate will-
ingly (ziyuan). (43)
We give small gifts, but volunteering is not paid. It is symbolic; we
are thanking them for their services. (44)
Volunteering implies both moral and physical commitment. The residents’
committees look for “active” (jiji) retired people, that is to say, motivated
and in fairly good health. They fit the description of an “active and likeable
pensioner,” an “indefatigable person” as defined by Jay Rowell in East Ger-
many (Rowell 2006, p. 285):
An active pensioner is someone who does not want to endure re-
tirement but who wants to continue to learn new things or to teach.
We are always looking for this type of person, we need them. (45)
We spot them in the cultural and sports leisure activities we organise.
We can see these people are energetic, have a sense of responsibility
(zerengan), and are able to participate. (46)
In particular, the security patrols need to be in good physical condition in
order to keep up the pace needed for outdoor patrol duties: 
In each apartment block, a volunteer serves as an intermediary. In
the street, volunteers wearing red armbands keep watch. If there are
intruders, they can spot them. My sight is bad. Before, I too was a
member of the security patrols, but I can’t see clearly anymore. What
good would I be as a volunteer if there were a thief and I couldn’t
see him? (47)
The resident-volunteers are recruited to serve as intermediaries by virtue
of being long-standing residents of Beijing, and because of their involvement
in their neighbourhoods and official structures of local organisations. Phys-
ical and normative surveillance of the neighbourhood by volunteers chosen
by the CCP cells of the residents’ committees has been presented in this
first section as the main vector of resident participation in these state struc-
tures that are attempting to gain legitimacy in the context of the transfor-
mation of power relationships in favour of the new property owners (Guan
and Cai 2015; Wang 2013). But resident-volunteering is also based on moral
commitment and the practices of the players in context.
Moral dimensions of the commitment of
volunteers in neighbourhood networks
The volunteering system in the neighbourhoods of Beijing is organised,
run, and implemented by a para-administrative chain at the residents’ com-
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35. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 10 June 2008.
36. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 18 June 2008.
37. Observations, historic quarter, April-May 2015.
38. An idea discussed by Isabelle Thireau, seminar on “Social norms and legitimacy in the People’s
Republic of China,” EHESS, 2014-2015.
39. Female resident, workers’ quarter, 25 April 2007.
40. Volunteer housing intermediary, historic quarter, 5 November 2008.
41. Security Volunteers, historic quarter, 18 June 2008.
42. Recipient of the minimum urban income (dibao), workers’ quarter, 18 April 2007.
43. Employee of the residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 5 April 2007.
44. Director of a residents’ committee, historic quarter, 21 May 2008.
45. Deputy director of the residents’ committee, new quarter, 18 March 2007.
46. Director of a residents’ committee, historic quarter, 21 May 2008.
47. Volunteer gardener, workers’ quarter, 30 March 2007.
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mittee level. But the participation of the residents in this system reveals
fairly deep-seated motives that reveal the way in which individuals appro-
priate this activity.
A (non)voluntary commitment by residents who
appropriate their position
It’s not really volunteering. It’s a duty (yiwu). (48)
This extract from an interview directly highlights the ambiguities of this
commitment. No volunteer came forward spontaneously. They all confirm:
The residents’ committee sought us out. (49)
The residents’ committee has information on each resident (age, pro-
fessional situation). They asked us to become volunteers as soon as
we retired. It’s not compulsory, we can refuse. But in general, we don’t
have much to do (baitian dou mei shi), so we rarely refuse. (50)
The residents’ committee seeks us out directly and asks us if we are
willing to participate. In general, we have to agree, or they may take
it badly. Afterwards, they check that we come each week. (51)
The residents were therefore not the initiators of the commitment to vol-
unteering. Some of them even say they do not particularly welcome it. 
There is no feeling of attachment. We volunteer. That’s all. (52)
It’s like a mission (renwu), a duty (yiwu), there’s no enthusiasm. Per-
sonally, I don’t really like volunteering, but my husband doesn’t mind
so he replaces me. I’m retired, but I find that it’s just like a job. (53)
The officials of the residents’ committees use tactics of persuasion to cre-
ate personal relationships with certain residents. They target retired people
who fear that “free time” is a source of idleness: 
I have been a volunteer for around ten years, since my retirement.
Before, it wasn’t my concern. I was working. (54)
Volunteers, and more generally the neighbourhood’s elderly resi-
dents, have nothing else to do during the day than to meet on a
bench after meals and pass the time of day together. […] Moreover,
these are the people who come on the group outings we organise
for them. They don’t go out on their own initiative. (55)
The recruitment strategies are always relatively similar. Officials from the
residents’ committee come to an individual’s home with a view to influ-
encing their response (Joule and Beauvois 2004). They begin by compli-
menting them, saying they are trustworthy and that it would help a lot if
they agreed. They also cite the case of an elderly resident in the same build-
ing who has health problems. Many volunteers admit having been ap-
proached in this way, under the scrutiny of neighbours: 
It was the residents’ committee that asked us to become volunteers
to replace certain residents who were now too old. They were over
70 and could no longer patrol. So we could not refuse, out of respect
for those people. (56)
“Young pensioners” therefore become members of the “security patrols”
because they do not dare refuse. This form of civic duty is part of the social
conventions that have been assimilated by long-standing residents. The feel-
ing of belonging to a neighbourhood as well as the relationships developed
with neighbours creates obligations. Being retired and having free time leads
to feelings of guilt at not participating:
In the beginning, it was the residents’ committee that came to ask me if
I would agree to become a volunteer. […] Two officials came to my house
and explained that a neighbour on the ground floor had difficulty walking.
As she could no longer perform her duties he was looking for someone in
the same building to replace her. […] All the neighbours know each other,
so I would feel too embarrassed (bu hao yisi) to refuse. (57)
Anxiety over free time is widespread amongst urban Chinese pensioners
and induces in them a strongly marked sense of responsibility (Rochot
2017). The idea of “volunteering” is therefore ambiguous, since the com-
mitment is influenced by the norm governing the use of free time for the
common good against idleness, counter-productivity, and selfishness. (58)
The recruitment of volunteers by co-optation is mixed in with other mo-
tives. The object of the “security patrols” is to provide a guarantee of safety.
Chinese towns are seen as dangerous and full of risk. For example, personal
possessions in a public (bicycles) or private (home) space are not fully in-
sured against theft and damage. As a result, any additional surveillance such
as the presence of red-armband volunteers who are able to call the police
and bear witness to what they have seen is welcomed, particularly in the
historic quarters and work unit estates, where security is more limited. Risk
acts as an effective factor in mobilisation: 
Naturally there are security problems in the neighbourhood such as
theft and scams. Look at that little street just behind – a man was
killed there! (59)
Of course there are security problems… Well, not in our building, but
in the one next to us, for example, there have been burglaries. (60)
This volunteering is very important; it’s a guarantee of security and
order. (61)
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48. Four red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 18 June 2008.
49. Volunteer, workers’ quarter 22 September 2007.
50. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 10 June 2008.
51. Red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 11 April 2007.
52. Five red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 3 May 2007.
53. Red-armband volunteer, workers’ quarter, 3 May 2007.
54. Building supervisor, workers’ quarter, 26 April 2007.
55. Two employees of the residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 6 June 2008.
56. Red-armband volunteer, workers’ quarter, 25 April 2007.
57. Red-armband volunteer, workers’ quarter, 10 May 2007.
58. Recipients of welfare payments (dibao) had to become volunteers. (Employees of the residents’
committee, historic quarter, 3 April 2007).
59. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 6 April 2007.
60. Female resident, workers’ quarter, 31 March 2007.
61. Red-armband volunteer, workers’ quarter, 5 April 2007.
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The red armband is a way of warning off thieves. It’s a means of dis-
suasion. (62)
The 17th Congress of the Communist Party is about to take place.
This event takes place every four years and it’s important to provide
security for it, as no problems must occur on those days. […] No, I
am not a member of the Communist Party. But it’s important to en-
sure security; it’s the task and duty of every inhabitant. [Have you
ever witnessed security problems?] No, never. Why would there be
any problem? It’s precisely thanks to all the security organisations
that we have in China! (63)
This account demonstrates the social importance of fear in residential
space (Li 2010), through which the volunteers justify the usefulness of their
presence. 
Moreover, volunteering is carried out by long-standing residents who have
a strong attachment to their local area, know it well, and move around it
frequently. It is more firmly anchored in the old quarters, where resident
delegates have always existed. 
It has existed for a long time, since the Cultural Revolution! We call
it “mobilising the masses” (fadong qunzhong). […] Previously, the
residents’ committees were made up of housewives who did not re-
ceive a salary and who mediated in disputes and ensured order in
the neighbourhood. […] Now they are salaried, so they ask residents
to ensure harmony amongst neighbours. (64)
This quotation, which refers to the militancy of the Maoist era, shows that
it constituted a key moment in the political mobilisation and ideological
control of the population in China and that it represents a turning-point in
the history of the maintenance of public order. As for the idea of “harmony,”
this confirms that the official slogans have been assimilated by the volun-
teers whilst at the same time bearing witness to transformations in the sys-
tem of local surveillance. In the streets of the historic city centre and in the
socialist housing estates, there is a heavy presence of volunteers because
this kind of surveillance systems has persisted there for a long time. In a
town that has seen rapid change in both social and spatial terms, the con-
tinuation of these practices allows older people, animated by a distinct feel-
ing of insecurity, to find familiar landmarks and develop shared social codes. 
Lastly, the volunteers adapt to the constraints of this activity since they cre-
ate “ways of doing” that are compatible with their tastes. Volunteering stim-
ulates sociability. Most “security patrols” do other things apart from patrolling:
they play cards, converse, make friends, etc. These methods of sociability are
characteristic of older, or less mobile (geographically and socially) people, in
particular those from modest backgrounds. So volunteering is institutionalised
by the residents’ committee but is appropriated by the residents, who also
use it to create their social space. The motivation of the volunteers is therefore
influenced by generational and geographical variations in the way in which
free time and security is seen, and by local political and urban cultures.
Three variations on the services: Resident
volunteering in neighbourhood governance 
Derived from the famous Maoist slogan “Serve the People” (wei renmin
fuwu), the idea of “service” is omnipresent in neighbourhood volunteering,
yet is nonetheless ambiguous. The activity reveals several levels of service. 
Firstly, volunteering provides services to others and is an activity that aims
to serve the public good (gongyi) rather than personal interests. Officially
and in practice, volunteers offer services that stem from a sense of civic and
moral duty, for the benefit of residents and passers-by in the neighbourhood.
Behind the official political slogans, the motives for making this sort of com-
mitment are rooted less in ideology than in the past. Volunteers use the idea
of “public good” (gongyi) in a more psychological and social sense that even
extends to religious motives. (65) Volunteering is, in fact, motivated by the
moral satisfaction of doing good deeds. This is borne out by the frequent ref-
erences by volunteers to Lei Feng, a historic example of giving of oneself to
accomplish “good deeds,” but in an individualised manner, as David Palmer
and Rundong Ning (2017, p. 37) have observed. The idea of services offered
to others, admittedly in a limited capacity, reinforces the norms of civic duty
and moral responsibility, since volunteers appear to be trustworthy people:
You ask what the red armband is for? It guarantees that I am some-
one with good intentions and that you can ask me for help. There
are so many con artists around nowadays that people need to be re-
assured that I am someone they can trust. (66)
Moreover, residents with a job, who are absent from the neighbourhood
during the day and are not much concerned by the activities of the resi-
dents’ committees and the volunteers, also believe that the latter can but
be useful and do not wish to see them disappear. A second level of service
exists centred on the mutual exchange of favours between volunteers and
the officials of the residents’ committee:
Before, I wanted to transform my rural hukou into an urban hukou. I
was born in Beijing but was sent into the countryside during the Cul-
tural Revolution, hence the rural hukou. So I appealed to the resi-
dents’ committee. They asked me to become a security volunteer. I
agreed. When I obtained my urban hukou I didn’t dare stop. (67)
Services form a chain in the form of favour and counter-favour as part of
a network based on reciprocity (Yan 1996; Yang 1994). On a professional
level, the vast majority of volunteers come from the public sector. These
people are more willing to join official social organisations. In addition, they
see retirement as a “free salary” that must be paid for. Becoming a volunteer
is, for many, a means of “giving back to the state.”
We receive money from the state although we don’t work. So our
good deeds are a way of giving something back to the state. (68)
I am 77 and I began volunteering when I was 50. I was a manual
worker and was given early retirement when the factory closed. I vol-
unteer to serve the people (wei renmin fuwu) because in giving up
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62. Red-armband volunteer, workers’ quarter, 10 May 2007.
63. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 11 October 2007.
64. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 6 May 2015.
65. For example, near the Guanghua temple, one volunteer is younger than the others. His motive is
religious: he is Buddhist (Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 6 April 2007). 
66. Security volunteer, historic quarter, 30 September 2015. 
67. Security volunteer, historic quarter, 18 April 2007.
68. Two red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 7 May 2015.
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my free time, I can give something to the state by contributing to
the public good (gongyi). (69)
In this circle of reciprocity, the co-optation of resident-volunteers by the
residents’ committees is a component in the mechanism of public action,
directing it into the realm of security (mutual surveillance) and practical
action (mutual favours). The volunteers appreciate the little gifts they re-
ceive, distinctive rewards (coats bearing the name of the neighbourhood),
or symbolic monetary payments distributed during the traditional festivals.
We have just finished a meeting with our volunteers. To thank them, we
promised we would soon organise a series of lectures on health, inviting
doctors to give free consultations. The pensioners were very pleased. (70)
The status of volunteer does not necessarily mean submission to the local
authorities, however. Under cover of their public role, volunteers can ex-
change other sorts of information. To all appearances, a certain resident
member of the “security patrols” would seem to be a dedicated neighbour-
hood militant. The residents’ committee officials do not know that this
woman and three other volunteers spend a great deal of their patrolling
time complaining of the injustices they feel have been done to them and
insulting the residents’ committee. Neither do they know that she spends
her other days protesting in the Beijing office of Letters and Visits over a
housing ownership problem. (71)
Nonetheless, because they involve reciprocity, certain residents refuse to
become involved in these relationships of dependence on the CCP system
and do not become volunteers. (72)
Finally, a third level of service can be identified: mutual services between
the volunteers. Volunteering has proved compatible with the lifestyle of
many older people who need to remain active and spend time outdoors
to “take some exercise” (duanlian shenti). This “physical participation” is
linked to motives of health and leisure. Elderly volunteers say that the ac-
tivity stimulates their mind more effectively than remaining at home and
helps them avoid early-onset dementia. Today’s volunteering has redefined
the activism of early Maoist China in favour of a moral and social com-
mitment on the part of older people. I tell the volunteers that in France
this type of volunteering does not exist. A woman reacts to this, saying: 
But who is in charge of controlling the population, then? And don’t
older people with nothing to do volunteer? What on earth do they
do, then? (73)
In Beijing, volunteering enables older people to continue to feel useful and
gives them a sense of satisfaction that explains their long-term commit-
ment, yet without demanding too much of them or placing them under
undue stress. The rhythm of this type of regular activity is useful in the
lifestyles of pensioners faced with time to spare and on whom solitude
weighs heavily. 
We’ve been volunteers for ten years. […] We like to do it because
we’re retired and have nothing to do during the day. […] And it’s a
way of taking exercise. (74)
Volunteering is a vector of socialisation and minor prestige. Many volun-
teers are happy to be using their local knowledge for the good of the com-
munity. In particular, the red armband of the “security patrols,” a strong
symbolic element, gives the volunteers a form of moral exemplarity. 
The many motives of the volunteers contribute to the exercise of public
action. As a network of exchange of local knowledge and also of know-how,
the system is one example of public action practiced “under” the state. This
type of volunteering allows residents’ committees to benefit not only from
local assistance and shared information but also from advice and criticism
concerning the neighbourhood. Certain volunteers put forward suggestions,
since the various needs and demands can be taken into account. Their more
intimate knowledge of places and people enable certain problems to be
solved. “There is a feeling of responsibility towards people…especially peo-
ple who do not come from around here and who cause problems.” (75)
Local management, since it makes use of resident-volunteers, constitutes a
logistical facility in the maintenance of public order. If these volunteers can
prove devoted in helping passers-by who have lost their way or in helping
people in difficulty by directing them or passing on their messages, they can
also prove particularly active in denouncing deviant behaviour such as beg-
ging, street vending, and gossiping, which, although it functions as entertain-
ment, also contributes to forms of stigmatisation even exclusion (Elias 1985).
Conclusion
This ethnographic study on “volunteer” (zhiyuanzhe) residents in the
neighbourhoods of Beijing highlights all the ambiguities inherent in grass-
roots Chinese organisations. By engaging in volunteering, residents respond
to an official demand defined by the local authorities, in what appears to
be a form of “institutional militancy” (Politix 2005). The call to civic duty is
presented as spontaneous and active participation on the part of the vol-
unteers. The promotion of volunteering allows the residents’ committees
to maintain an image of “local democracy” (jiceng minzhu): to the extent
that the volunteers agree to “play the good citizen” (Talpin 2006), the sys-
tem includes forms of participation in local affairs. However, it remains the
case that participants are selected and controlled by CCP cells at the level
of the residents’ committees, against a background of indifference on the
part of other residents towards these players. For their part, the volunteers
accept these demands because they are motivated by a sense of moral re-
sponsibility, and their mission is a source of sociability.
The study of resident mobilisation also revealed the motives for this type
of commitment as well as specific local usage, in that not all volunteers be-
come involved to the same degree in their neighbourhood, and that differ-
ences exist depending on the type of housing. The question therefore arises
of closed architecture and the predominance of management norms in the
commodity housing units in Chinese towns, with their increasingly sophisti-
cated security equipment that has resulted in the computerised monitoring
of public space, and with it the question of whether residents’ participation
in local affairs might take a new direction in the context of the development
of property rights and the role of owners’ committees toblis the detriment of
the figure of the resident (Rocca 2017; Guo Shen and Chen 2014; Merle 2014).
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69. Security volunteer, historic quarter, 5 May 2015.
70. Director and Party Secretary of the residents’ committee, workers’ quarter, 4 May 2015.
71. Security volunteer, historic quarter, 18 April 2007.
72. Long-standing resident, historic quarter, 27 August 2016.
73. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 9 November 2012.
74. Four red-armband volunteers, historic quarter, 5 November 2008.
75. Red-armband volunteer, historic quarter, 9 June 2008.
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